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After the Financial Services Action Plan: 






However passé it may seem, the practise of national politicians blaming Brussels for 
whatever political or economic ills beset their countries appears to resurrect 
whenever the only viable alternative is domestic reform. Nowhere is this realisation 
more evident than in the caustic French debate over the EU’s proposed 
Constitutional Treaty: the notion of liberalising trade in services within the EU was 
anathema to the average French voter in 2005. And yet, as a pillar of the 1957 
Rome Treaty, the principle of free trade in (goods and) services represented a 
cornerstone of the drive for deeper integration over the past fifty years (!), not to 
mention that in the aftermath of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, services market 
liberalisation—up to that point the Achilles heal of the Single Market—was to be 
pursued with renewed vigour.  The violent re-awakening of a debate that was 
supposedly closed half a century ago thus acquires a particular flavour of irony 
against the morbid backdrop of the steadily declining global competitiveness of the 
EU economy. As the stoic Januses in national administrations fight off intra-EU 
competition, paradoxically seen to be the enemy of national “competitiveness”, 
while at the same time trying to condition the EU into becoming a heavyweight on 
the international scene, the limpid corpse of the Lisbon Agenda languishes in the 
graveyard of unfulfilled political promises. Is a similar fate awaiting the bold 
undertaking—launched in 1999—to create a single market in financial services? 
  
Phase I of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) is now drawing to a close. With 
the adoption of the revised Capital Adequacy Directive that transposes Basel II 
principles into EU law in October 2005, as well as the adoption of the 10
th Company 
Law Directive in the same month, forty-one out of the forty-two directives originally 
planned have been adopted through the co-decision procedure. The last holdout is 
the 14th Company Law Directive on the cross-border transfer of the registered 
office of limited companies. Although the Commission was able to achieve 93% of 
the legislative program before the promised mid-2004 deadline, a single market is 
not created from EU legislative initiatives alone. Much more important still is the 
ability and willingness of the Member States to implement the legislation in a timely 
and accurate manner and above all to enforce it. 
  
So far, the FSAP record is at best mixed. As shown on the DG Market website, the 
rate of transposition of FSAP directives at the national level remains pitifully low. 
With a view to buttressing the Lisbon Agenda with a vibrant single market, the 
Commission had set a target transposition rate of 98.5%. But as of May 2005, the 
best performers (Austria, Denmark, Germany and Ireland) were just barely over 
80%. On the other hand, the efforts of some other Member States can be 
characterised as none other than miserable, led by the Netherlands and Greece 
(just over 40%). Many new member states are struggling, although one must 
appreciate the enormity of the task that lies before them to implement the existing 
acquis as well as to keep up to date on the latest FSAP measures.  
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Some directives have been plagued with horrid transposition rates: According to the 
Commission transposition tables, not a single Member State notified the Commission 
about the Conglomerates Directive; the Accounting Provisions of Company Law and 
Market Abuse Directives (MAD) achieved implementation of below 5% and barely above 
10%, respectively, at the time of the transposition deadline. In fact, only one country, 
Lithuania, had complied with the October 2004 deadline set in the MAD. The directives on 
winding up of credit institutions (40%) and fair value accounting faired better (just below 
50%), but were still not implemented by a majority of Member States.   
  
At this stage, a parallel can be drawn with the effort to create a Single Market in the run-
up to Maastricht. Armed with the principle of mutual recognition, Jacques Delors and Lord 
Cockfield were able to push through 282 directives and regulations to dismantle existing 
non-tariff barriers to trade. By the target date of 31 December 1992, over 90% of the 
planned legislation had been passed and over 8 0 %  o f  i t  h a d  b e e n  t r a n s p o s e d  a t  t h e  
Member State level. But despite the declaration at Maastricht, the creation of a Single 
Market in goods and services remains an ongoing project.  
  
The liberalisation of financial services is rendered especially difficult by the large spaces 
carved-out from the freedom of movement/establishment principles by generous 
interpretations of the ‘general good’ clause. In the face of information asymmetries and 
systemic risks, national regulators, perhaps prodded by dominant firms in their 
jurisdictions, have trouble believing that their counterparts in other Member States can 
achieve the same level of investor protection for their nationals and ensure the same 
degree of systemic stability in their home jurisdictions. As such, the general good clause 
represents a major non-tariff barrier to trade in financial services. The new Lamfalussy 
committee structure should help to pare down protectionist abuses by fostering trust-
building exercises, although one cannot expect a sea-change overnight.  
  
As the dust from the frantic legislative efforts of recent years settles, something of a 
consensus view has emerged on the FSAP and how to proceed with the single market for 
financial services. First, it is too early to judge whether or not the FSAP has been a 
success, since enforcement is the key. Second, a greater emphasis must be placed on 
external competitiveness. Third, close international cooperation is vital. Fourth, new 
legislation must remain limited to a few targeted fields, guaranteeing that no FSAP II will 
follow. Overall, regulatory impact assessments will be a litmus test for new legislative 
initiatives, and greater use of non-legislative instruments is expected. Foremost among 
these is competition policy. Commissioner Neelie Kroes has already signalled her 
intention to launch a broad sectoral investigation into financial services in the near 
future. 
  
Since the stakes are so high, the Commission must react to flagrant Treaty violations 
with gusto. The Kok Report on revamping the Lisbon Agenda has suggested that the 
Commission respond aggressively to a lack of cooperation on the part of Member States 
in exercising their responsibilities vis-à-vis the Single Market by “naming and shaming” 
the sinners. President Barroso signalled at the outset of his mandate that he prefers less 
confrontational tactics. Nevertheless, free-riders must not be allowed to carry on, as they 
cost the EU valuable points in terms of lost economic growth.  
  
Going forward, close cooperation between various Commission departments, especially 
DGs Trade, Markt and Competition, will be vital to ensuring coherence in policy. 
Continued inter-institutional rivalries and the jealous guarding of sovereignty that was 
already ceded to the EU must not be allowed to strangle the Single Market. Already, it 
has a history of trying to allocate resources efficiently while handcuffed. How to motivate 
the Member States to exercise ownership was, and will remain, the outstanding policy 
challenge with regard to creating a single market for financial services in the EU and to 
realising the unexploited potential of this powerful engine for economic growth. 